

## ***THINK-TANK TASK FORCE 3***

### **SECURITY IN EUROPE**

- FAES Foundation (*lead organisation*)
- Fondation pour l'Innovation Politique
- Austrian Institute for European Security Policy
- József Antall Foundation
- Hanns Seidel Foundation
- Fondation Robert Schuman
- Political Academy of ÖVP

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### ***ANALYSIS***

- ◆ Europe faces a serious security problem. Europeans find themselves threatened on their own soil by external forces, such as Islamic terrorism, yet the institutional security agenda continues to focus on catering for the requirements of a strategic and security environment that pre-dates September 11<sup>th</sup>, March 11<sup>th</sup> and July 7<sup>th</sup>. If we wish to tailor the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to the demands of the new strategic environment, we must urgently review the assumptions that have governed both the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and the ESDP in recent years and consider adopting new strategic approaches.
- ◆ The entire European security policy is based on a series of premises that are worth recalling when judging whether this policy meets today's needs. First of all, it is generally recognised that no nation can be a world player without having all the instruments of power at its disposal, ranging from economic and cultural clout to diplomatic and military strength. In this respect, the soft-power dimension of the EU must be complemented by certain military capabilities, or hard-power characteristics.
- ◆ The spectacular expansion in terms of security and defense within Europe in recent years is the direct consequence of two considerations:
  - Europeans should be prepared to handle security and defense challenges on their own continent, because the traditional guarantor of security throughout Europe, the United States, has not always been prepared to intervene to ensure stability in Europe's outlying areas. During the Balkans Crisis in the 1990's, Europeans felt that the American administration was too reluctant to act and left a strategic power void that needed to be filled.
  - When the Americans decide to intervene militarily to preserve world peace and stability, the disparity between EU and US capabilities is blatant: it has become increasingly difficult to operate jointly. The result is a clear weakening of the relationship between the Allies and an emerging difference regarding their respective missions, namely, combat duties for America and stabilization and reconstruction for Europe. These developments will be detrimental in the long term.

- ◆ This strategic void and military disparity, alongside the political ambition to act as a world player, help to explain the EU's development of the European Security and Development Policy since 1998.
- ◆ Today, the EU has the institutional framework to take decisions regarding security and defence, but it does not have the military capability to carry out any large-scale sustained operation over time. Despite all the rhetoric, the EU's strategic horizon is not to undertake high-intensity operations, but to carry out wide-ranging peace support missions - where the use of military force is specific, specialised and brief.
- ◆ The gap between EU declared policy, which is essentially enshrined in the Solana document, and the actual circumstances are not only self-evident, but have made the situation unsustainable. Europe's strategic ambitions must be revised beyond the agenda of the 1990s: peace stabilisation and support missions. It is essential to review the tools that will enable the armed forces of the member states to develop and move forward together in a coordinated manner.
- ◆ Since the distinction between internal security and international security has been blown away by Islamic terrorist attacks, a greater degree of cooperation between Europe's Justice and Home Affairs Policies and the CSDP/ESDP is urgently required in order to tackle successfully the challenge of implementing a European counter-terrorism strategy.
- ◆ Only by adopting the correct strategic approach to new threats - terrorism, proliferation and Islamic radicalism - and by developing the necessary military capabilities, will Europe be able to contribute to a coherent and effective Allied defence strategy, one that strengthens the Atlantic link instead of undermining it, both within and outside NATO.

### ***RECOMMENDATIONS***

- ◆ The EU structures should encourage the military transformation of its member states along the same lines as NATO. The European armed forces must be adequately equipped, manned and trained so as to meet the current strategic challenges.
- ◆ The recently established European Defence Agency could play a key role in the acquisition process - although without a strategic rationale shared by all EU members the risk is that the EDA will be more corporate than strategically driven.
- ◆ Clear guidelines, derived from Solana's paper, are needed to create the capabilities for operations other than peace keeping and peace support. This could take the form of an addendum to the strategic concept outlined by Solana.
- ◆ Since the EU ability to act resides in member states' armed forces, the EU should set up criteria to measure the defence effort and promote convergence in this field. Alternative schemes like pooling or specialisation seem even more difficult given that all member states have decided to retain full spectrum capabilities, even if doing so results in smaller armies and fewer resources.
- ◆ Security is dependent on global factors, the transatlantic link must be preserved. Europe should not move against the will or policies of our best ally, the United States.

### ***PRACTICAL STEPS***

- ◆ To guarantee a better protection against terrorism in Europe, Europeans should initiate direct exchanges with NATO which are at a visible political level. We call for bilateral informal meetings between both EU and NATO ministers dealing with terrorism.
- ◆ To strengthen the transatlantic link, NATO must be transformed into again being a security provider for all its members and Europe as a whole. It should engage in a strategic dialogue, and focus more on the current existing and emerging threats. European effort should complement NATO's initiatives.
- ◆ The EU must pursue a policy of eradicating all kinds of barriers in the transatlantic area. A common area of prosperity is the best guarantee for our mutual relationship, with a proportional sharing of the security burden. We can do this by reinforcing the agenda at the EU-US summits.
- ◆ A common review of national transformational efforts is indispensable if Europe wants to have the military capability necessary to fulfill our requirements for security.